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The term ‘worldview’ harbours different dimensions that are not always clearly distinguished. 
A worldview can be considered to be a personal matter, but it may also be a more collective 
phenomenon, as it can manifest itself for example within a certain sphere of life (e.g. politics 
or economics) as a full-blown ideology or a more implicit ‘embedded worldview’. A second 
distinction can be made between the dimension of a deep, existential commitment and that 
of an encompassing mental framework, between spiritual inspiration and a more or less 
intellectually coherent system. There may be tensions between these various dimensions. 
Having a worldview as a person may imply being in conflict with other worldviews that are 
embodied in certain social fields. How can people deal with these conflicts? One can easily 
be seduced to avoid the conflicts and to shift gears between them. With the credit crisis and 
economics used as an illustration, this article explores some of the techniques that people 
– consciously, semi-consciously or unconsciously – may employ to navigate the differences 
between various social domains and their inherent worldviews. In order to support people to 
regain some unity, the notion of worldview may still be helpful, but interpreted primarily as 
‘deep commitment’. 
© 2012. The Authors.
Licensee: AOSIS 
OpenJournals. This work
is licensed under the
Creative Commons
Attribution License.
The Unity of a Worldview
A possible definition of ‘worldview’ that has become rather well-known in Christian circles is 
that of Al Wolters (1985:2), ‘a worldview is the comprehensive framework of one’s basic beliefs 
about things.’ 
After providing this definition, Wolters sets out to explain all the key concepts used: comprehensive 
framework, basic, beliefs, things. There is, however, one word that Wolters does not for one 
moment pause to elaborate upon: ‘one’s’. Apparently, this word is entirely unproblematic. A 
worldview is something that ‘one person’ holds.1 
The obvious criticism to this is of course that worldviews are usually, or at least to a large extent, 
held by human beings together in groups, tribes, peoples, even civilizations. It is a communal 
phenomenon. A person who has an entirely private worldview probably wouldn’t be able 
to survive for a long time. One could argue this point using Wittgenstein’s famous ‘private 
language argument’ as an analogy. But I’m not going to pursue that avenue here, apart from 
1.Cf. Naugle (2002:260) ‘A worldview refers to a person’s interpretation of reality and a basic view of life.’
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Werklikheidsbeskouing, die kredietkrisis en die ‘eenheid van die lewe’. Van ‘raamwerk’ tot 
‘diep verbintenis’. Die begrip ‘werklikheidsbeskouing’ het minstens twee dimensies wat nie 
altyd duidelik onderskei word nie. Die begrip kan na iets individueel verwys, maar ook na ’n 
meer kollektiewe fenomeen, byvoorbeeld wanneer daar binne ’n bepaalde sosiale domein (soos 
die politiek of die ekonomie) sprake is van ’n rigtinggewende ideologie of ’n meer implisiete 
verwysingsraamwerk. Tweedens kan die begrip verwys na sowel diepe eksistensiële keuses 
as na ’n omvattende, sistematiese geheel van oortuigings, dus na ’n spirituele inspirasie sowel 
as ’n sisteem wat intellektueel min of meer koherent is. Tussen hierdie verskillende dimensies 
kan spanninge voorkom. Die lewensbeskouing waaroor ’n individu beskik kan in konflik 
wees met ander lewensbeskouings wat in bepaalde sosiale domeine beliggaam is. Hoe kan 
persone met hierdie konflikte omgaan? ’n Mens kan maklik verlei word om die konflikte te 
vermy en om bloot hiertussen oor te skakel of ‘ratte te verwissel’. Hierdie artikel maak van die 
kredietkrisis en die rol van ekonomiese wetenskappe gebruik om te illustreer watter ‘tegnieke’ 
persone kan aanwend – bewustelik, half-bewustelik of onbewustelik – om te navigeer tussen 
hulle inherente werklikheidsvisies en die verskeie implisiete werklikheidsbeskouings in die 
verskillende sosiale domeine. Die begrip ‘werklikheidsbeskouing’ kan waardevol wees om 
’n mate van eenheid te herwin, maar dan primêr geïnterpreteer as die manifestasie van ’n 
eksistensiële keuse en diep verbintenis. 
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one rather important observation. Worldviews may be 
embodied in a certain social domain or practice without 
many people actually fully endorsing it as their own 
personal, encompassing framework. In recent years we 
have come to call ‘neo-liberalism’ a worldview, and it was a 
viewpoint that exerted its attraction or pressure on millions 
and millions of people, especially in politics and economics 
(cf. Harvey 2005). Yet it would probably have been quite 
hard to find individual persons in those spheres who took 
neo-liberalism as a fully encompassing view for their own 
lives. Arguably, even Milton Friedman had more to say 
about life and well-being than neo-liberalism proper would 
allow for.2 Perhaps we can reserve the name ‘ideology’ for the 
collectively held worldviews within certain social domains 
or, allowing for its often inarticulate presence, use the phrase 
‘embedded worldview’, as suggested by Sander Griffioen 
(2012:23ff.).  
However, there is another problem with the ‘one’ that 
interests me here: it presupposes that the person who has 
a worldview, is ‘one’, is a unity in respect to his or her 
worldview. Wolters’ definition not only presupposes (as 
do other authors’ definitions) that a worldview is itself a 
unity (‘comprehensive’, ‘framework’, etc.), invoking some 
degree of consistency or systematics as characteristic of 
a worldview,3 but that the person who holds a worldview 
is ‘one’, a unity. Although he admits that people may not 
always be entirely consistent, this seems to him very much 
an exception to the rule.4
It is exactly this conception of the human person as a unity 
that has been challenged in recent times, especially by 
philosophers who are often identified as ‘postmodern’. But 
before we are carried away by all kinds of highly contextual 
historical narratives of premodern, modern and postmodern 
ages, we should realise that the very problem of ‘one’ already 
seems to be present in very ancient texts. It looms large, for 
example, in an old Biblical poem, Psalm 86. In this Psalm 
we encounter the prayer ‘Unite my heart to fear thy name’. 
Apparently the heart is divided. Unity is still to come. The 
unity cannot be achieved by the Psalmist himself, by his own 
power. Apparently he has to pray for it, and appeal to the 
Lord to establish the unity. Apparently, the human heart 
is not one: it is two, or three, or many – who knows? The 
Psalm does not give an extensive analysis of why the heart 
is divided but assumes that the reader will recognise and 
understand the situation. 
An entirely different example of an inner division is to be 
found in the famous play, Antigone, by the Greek poet 
Sophocles. Antigone’s brother Polynices was killed whilst he 
2.Cf. Milton and Rose Friedman (1998:x). One of the opening statements of Rose 
Friedman, for example, tells us that she considers herself lucky for having had 
‘parents who provided love and caring in my formative years that unfortunately is 
missing in so many homes today.’ Apparently there is more to life than the pursuit 
of self-interest.
 
3.See David K. Naugle (2002), who in relation to his interpretation of worldview often 
speaks of ‘a system of signs generating a symbolic world’ (p. 291); ‘a semiotic system 
of narrative signs’ (p. 330). See also Clément Vidal (2008). 
4.Wolters (1985:5) ‘… not only might we hold to conflicting beliefs, but sometimes 
we might fail to act in harmony with the beliefs we hold.’ 
was attacking his own city Thebes. The new king of Thebes, 
Creon, issues an edict forbidding his burial. The corpse 
should be left uncovered so that dogs and birds will eat it, 
as a final humiliating punishment. Antigone, however, finds 
herself bound by a higher law, the divine customary law, 
that requires family members to be buried properly. So she 
is divided between the law of the king and the divine law. 
She arrives at a clear, single-minded decision: her brother 
should be buried – at all costs. For her, the justice of the 
divine family law is higher than the laws of the state. For 
this act she is sentenced to death by Creon. Haemon, the 
king’s son, secretly loves Antigone. He tries to convince his 
father that he should be able and willing to ponder various 
points of view. Perhaps by breaking Creon’s law, Antigone 
has made a valuable and respectable decision, he says. The 
son tells his father: ‘Don’t be too single-minded, then. Don’t 
think you have a complete monopoly of the truth. Isn’t it 
true that people who refuse to see any other point of view 
but theirs, often get shown up and discredited? There is no 
disgrace in being able to learn, being flexible’ (Sophocles ed. 
1965:50). The play, and especially the character Haemon, is 
interesting for it presents the ability to consider different 
points of view as something positive, as a virtue. Those who 
are single-minded, both Antigone and Creon, are presented 
here as bordering on madness and heading for clashes and 
even mutual destruction. In a sense both protagonists are 
portrayed as abnormal (although today’s reader’s sympathy 
is drawn to Antigone). There should be no monopoly on the 
truth. So a ‘divided heart’ (a phrase we don’t find in Antigone) 
a not solely an unhappy state to find oneself in, but can also 
be a positive thing. Should we strive to be ‘one’?
Apparently, ‘one-ness’ is not self-evidently characteristic 
of humans. On the contrary, perhaps it is the divided heart 
which is part of the human condition, ubique et semper, 
everywhere and always. That seems to be the opinion of Max 
Weber (1921) who in his famous 1917/1919 lecture ‘Science 
as a Vocation’ speaks about the ‘pure experience’ that leads 
to polytheism:  
The elder Mill, whose philosophy I will not praise otherwise, 
was on this point right when he said that if one proceeds from 
pure experience, one arrives at polytheism (p. 15).5
Apparently, many gods are attracting us and are offering to 
guide us and apparently we as human beings are inclined 
to acknowledge their claims, although they are diverse. 
Proceeding from ‘pure experience’ we may not immediately 
have the awareness of ‘one thing needful’. We may leave our 
heart divided without being troubled by it. 
Does then the awareness of the divided heart – as a problem 
– arise specifically in the encounter with the transcendent 
Creator-God of whom the Biblical Scriptures speak? The 
Psalm may suggest this option. It speaks of the many gods: 
‘Among the gods there is none like unto thee, O Lord’ 
(Ps 86:8). There is a plurality of gods, which in the future will 
5.See Weber (1988; 1921) and for the English translations as used in this article see Max 
Weber, Science as a Vocation (1922).
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give way to the universal acknowledgement of the One Lord, 
before whom all nations will bow down. But this is a future 
unity, and an individual like the Psalmist is not yet able to 
create this situation in his heart. The unity is ‘not yet’. In the 
encounter with the Lord, we discover our internal plurality, 
but now as a problem and no longer as a matter of fact or a 
matter of fate. 
This observation is in a sense also supported by Weber (1921). 
He suggests that the idea of ‘unity’ is very much tied to the 
great religions, Christianity included:
The grandiose rationalism of an ethical and methodical conduct 
of life which flows from every religious prophecy has dethroned 
this polytheism in favour of the ‘one thing that is needful’ (p. 15).
Weber even claims that ‘… our eyes have been blinded for 
a thousand years – blinded by the allegedly or presumably 
exclusive orientation towards the grandiose moral fervour of 
Christian ethics’ (p. 16).
This would imply that for Weber (1921) a divided heart is 
more likely to occur in post-Christian times: 
Today the routines of everyday life challenge religion. Many old 
gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence 
take the form of impersonal forces. They strive to gain power 
over our lives and again they resume their eternal struggle with 
one another (p. 15). 
When Christianity loses its grip on the lives of people, the 
possibility of holding on to different gods simultaneously 
resurfaces with new strength. Weber relates this to the 
different spheres that manifest themselves in the course of the 
rise of the modern world, the differentiation of life spheres. 
Each sphere may, so to speak, embody their own worldview 
(the phenomenon that was indicated above with the term 
‘embedded worldview’). And the individual, far from being 
‘one’, has no option but to deal with these various spheres. 
For Weber, this implies that ‘one’ still has to make ‘one’ 
choice, one ultimate choice. The individual has to choose 
one demon, one god, to give guidance to his or her life 
(Weber 1921:15). But at this very point, Weber may claim too 
much and may be suffering from a kind of Christian ‘hang-
over’ in the modern world. For true polytheists do not choose 
one god, they shift between gods, they are constantly shifting 
gears. In this way one person may well be able to hold 
different worldviews, and live according to these varying 
views as seems fit in each particular context. People shift 
gears as they move from one sphere of life to another. They 
navigate the differences between the spheres in this way. 
How does this ‘gear-system’ actually work? How do people 
shift gears from one domain to another, crossing consciously 
or unconsciously from one worldview to another? And 
what are the threats and dangers that come with these 
navigating abilities? When and to what extent is it wise to 
be a ‘polytheist’, and when and where does this become a 
danger to one’s integrity, to the integrity of the ‘one’, one’s 
heart, one’s personality?
Weber may actually have exaggerated the issue somewhat. 
The emergence of various social domains, which each has 
its own way of doing things, does not necessarily imply a 
deep conflict. They may also be the expression of a healthy 
diversity in human life and human action. A public official 
has to act according to the stated rules of the governmental 
bureaucracy, not according to his or her own whims or 
even worse, according to the money that some citizens can 
offer him or her whilst others cannot (had he or she been a 
salesperson of used cars, however, he or she would naturally 
be very much influenced by the price a customer offers). And 
a pastor in a church has to love his or her flock, but not in 
the same way that he or she loves his or her own wife or 
husband (if matters are well). At public occasions we tend to 
dress differently from a Saturday afternoon at home. These 
are all different types of behaviour that we may well engage 
in without suffering inner conflict. In the Dutch tradition of 
Christian social philosophy (articulated amongst others by 
Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, Goudzwaard and Griffioen), this is 
even fully acknowledged as God-given diversity. Human 
responsibility comes in the plural. 
But in another sense, Weber may be on to something. That is 
particularly the case when there are ‘embedded worldviews’ 
(Griffioen 2012) or even full-blown ideologies at work 
(Goudzwaard, Vander Vennen & Van Heemst 2007). In these 
cases one may really encounter ‘warring gods’, competing 
for our allegiance and obedience. One either has to choose or 
… find other solutions, for instance by disuniting oneself, by 
becoming ‘polytheistic’. 
To be sure, when we point out the problem of worldview 
in this way, we implicitly make a distinction between two 
meanings of the word ‘worldview’. The term harbours at least 
two dimensions that are not always clearly distinguished. 
It refers both to a deep spiritual or moral commitment, 
involving ultimate choices between good and evil, and 
to an encompassing mental framework, that of spiritual 
or moral-spiritual inspiration as well as of a more or less 
intellectually coherent system. These two dimensions may 
sometimes go together, but that may be more incidental than 
essential. Someone who lives on the basis of some precepts 
from Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount certainly has a deep 
commitment, but he or she doesn’t need to have something 
like a ‘comprehensive framework of basic beliefs’ (Wolters 
1985), let alone a ‘system of narrative signs’ (Naugle 2002). 
A contemporary illustration: The 
science of economics and the credit 
crisis
These questions may seem rather abstract at first. However, 
they may become very concrete if we look at the 2008 credit 
crisis and its aftermath.6 I referred earlier to neo-liberalism 
as an ‘embedded worldview’. The force of this worldview 
will become apparent when we ask why economists didn’t 
expect, predict, or reckon with the possibility of a crisis such 
as the 2008 credit crisis. At a somewhat deeper level, this 
6.This also refers the concrete background of this article. In September 2010 my 
colleague, Ad Verbrugge, and I were asked to teach philosophy of economics in the 
economics department of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 
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question is intimately connected to another one: how is it 
possible that reasonable, sometimes even highly intelligent 
people within a certain context operate with and on the basis 
of presumptions that they at the same time know to be wrong 
or at least deficient? How can they deal with, or navigate, 
the fundamental differences of outlook, perhaps even the 
differences between worldviews, that function within 
different spheres? 
Within the field of economics, the paradigm of the homo 
economicus, the rational chooser of preferences, is still highly 
influential. And yet, many, if not all, economists know that 
there is much more to life than rational choice theory allows 
for.7 For example, probably only an extremely small number 
of persons would have selected their spouses on the basis of 
a purely rational calculation of maximum utility. And yet, 
as soon as they are economists and settle in the morning 
behind their working desk in their office, they act ‘as if’ every 
human being actually does nothing else but calculate his or 
her own interests.8 The people who design this ‘as if’-world 
don’t actually live in this world themselves, nor – probably 
– would they actually like to live there, if it existed. And yet, 
they evoke this world in their own ‘virtual reality’. And then, 
at a certain point of time in the afternoon, the game is over, 
and they switch gears back again to ‘normal’, or – in case they 
have started to believe that their virtual reality is normal – to 
that other state of existence, their private life. How can one 
do that? 
People may also construct beautiful mathematical models 
that seem to tell a lot about economic reality. Once you 
have constructed them, they seem to convey the message of 
mastery, the message of control over reality. If you change this 
parameter a bit, look how the outcomes change accordingly! 
That there are entire sets of parameters, better identified as 
dimensions of reality, that are not included in the model, may 
have been realised at the time of construction, but once the 
models have been used for a while, people tend to forget this, 
with the consequence that the model is mistaken for reality. 
Or, as Paul Krugman (2009) has identified the symptoms, 
‘mistaking beauty for truth’.  
Fateful disunity
One could specify the problem of unity and disuniting 
and talk about it as something that specifically concerns 
Christians and a Christian worldview (in line with Weber), 
but it may be clear from the examples that I have just given 
that the problem is much broader than this and somehow 
concerns us all, regardless of our specific worldview. We 
have to face the question: how can people, who to a certain 
extent in their private lives may have something we would 
7.Or they can at least know, if only by reading the influential (but clearly not influential 
enough) analysis of Amartya Sen (1977).
8.One could even win a Nobel prize for applying these kinds of obviously wrong 
assumptions to as many fields of human existence as possible, as the case of Gary 
Becker shows. He applied economic decision making models (cost-benefit analyses) 
to as many non-economic spheres as he could think of marriage, friendship, the 
continuation of marriage, crime, organ donation, racial discrimination, having 
children, and so forth. He was awarded the price in 1992 for ‘having extended 
the domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behaviour and 
interaction, including nonmarket behaviour’ or, as was said as well, for ‘extending 
the sphere of economic analysis to new areas of human behaviour and relations’. 
call a more or less coherent worldview, dissociate themselves 
from that worldview for a certain time each day when they 
enter a domain in which an entirely different ‘worldview’ 
may be embodied and/or practised? 
I would propose the possibility that there are certain 
‘mechanisms’ or ‘strategies’ that human beings have at their 
disposal in order to be able to divide themselves, to dissociate 
themselves. As was said earlier, it is in itself not problematic 
when one is able to participate in various spheres, according 
to rules and rule-systems that are fitting for those spheres. 
A judge is called to a different type of behaviour than a 
business woman or man, and a politician to something else 
again. One may characterise this as being faithful to one’s job, 
to one’s calling. 
However, in this section I will elaborate on ways in which 
people develop not a faithful, but a fateful disunity within 
the heart. Disunity can be fateful when it implies a partial 
or wholesale abandonment or bracketing of moral impulses, 
allowing oneself to act in one context in a way that one would 
certainly deem morally despicable in another. We can speak 
of fateful ‘disunity’ when someone is not really able to look in 
the mirror at the end of a day’s work and take responsibility 
for his or her deeds during that day. In terms of medieval 
and/or Christian moral anthropology one can speak of a 
silencing of one’s conscience [conscientia], one’s personal 
connection to a moral order.    
There may be at least six different ways that people can 
travel in this respect, techniques that can be employed in 
order to ‘disunite’. I call them respectively (1) enchantment, 
(2) thoughtlessness, (3) transfer of responsibility, (4) creating 
distance (5) the pursuit of ‘divertissements’ and (6) the public-
private split. In a specific Christian context one can even add 
a seventh: (7) the separation of the sacred and the profane. 
Seven paths to fateful disunity
Enchantment (or: letting yourself be seduced)
‘Why did economists get it so wrong?’ is the central 
question that Nobel prize winner Paul Krugman posed in 
2009 to his colleagues in the New York Times essay to which 
I referred above. Not long ago, he noted, economists were 
congratulating themselves on the success of their field. 
Longstanding disputes had been solved, things were under 
control, there was ‘a convergence of vision’. Economists had 
come to believe in the so-called ‘inherent stability of the 
markets’. Then he comes up with the following stunning 
diagnosis: ‘as I see it, the economics profession went astray 
because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in 
impressive-looking mathematics, for truth’.
Something similar had happened before, for example in the 
early twentieth century. However, the great depression of 
the 1930s had blown away the idea of capitalism as a near 
perfect system. But now again, as this earlier memory of the 
failure of capitalism faded, ‘… economists fell back in love 
with the old, idealized vision of an economy in which rational 
individuals interact in perfect markets, this time gussied up 
with fancy equations’.
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What Krugman states here is that one can become ‘enchanted’, 
carried away, seduced by the paradigms (to use Thomas 
Kuhn’s term) of a certain domain in which one operates. 
Stated more generally the key question is: when one has a 
certain worldview, is one able and willing to act on it when 
one enters various spheres of life, or does one become 
enchanted, entrapped in the dynamics of what perhaps is 
another worldview-in-action? One can be enchanted by the 
beauty of a field or the sheer dynamics of a certain domain, 
or be so impressed by the astonishing achievements of that 
field or of a certain empire (political, economic, ecclesiastical 
or whatever) that one wants to be ‘part of the game’, wants to 
be in, not out – at nearly all costs. 
Thoughtlessness
A second ‘technique’ that people may use to dissociate 
or disunite, may be what Hannah Arendt has called 
‘thoughtlessness’. The case that she is discussing is a very 
serious one: that of Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi official who 
was administratively responsible for the deportation and 
eventual killing of many thousands of Jews. Arendt attended 
the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem and was struck by the 
impression that this man was not all ‘evil’ in the classical 
sense of the world, beset by a dark spirit of destruction, a 
diabolos, but seemed to be a much more superficial figure. In 
connection with this she coined the phrase ‘the banality of evil’ 
(Arendt 1963). The key element of this ‘banality’ is the simple 
refusal to think. ‘Thoughtlessness’, is the term that Arendt 
uses (Arendt 1978:3ff). Eichmann knew his worldview. He 
even quoted favourably the philosopher Immanuel Kant and 
his ‘categorical imperative ’ that urges humans to treat every 
human being as you would like to be treated yourself (one of 
the versions of this imperative). But Eichmann simply gave 
up his worldview and adopted another one, that of obedience 
to the Führer and to act in such a way that he would approve 
of my deeds if he knew about them. What would Hitler do? 
In this way Eichmann abandoned the inner dialogue, which 
for Arendt is what ‘thinking’ is about. For her, to think is to 
be consciously ‘two-in-one’, to examine oneself, to question 
oneself, and in this way prepare oneself for an independent 
judgement, not to surrender one’s judgement to someone 
else (Arendt 1978:180ff). And so Eichmann simply refused 
the examined life; he did not care to think about himself and 
the world. 
Transfer of responsibility
There is another aspect to the Eichmann case, the transfer of 
responsibility. In a certain institutional setting people can 
develop a tendency to eschew their own role, deny their 
own range of choices, and use the rules and dynamics of the 
institution as a cover. In her impressive verdict on Eichmann, 
at the end of her report, Arendt (1963) points out what the 
problem is when we are dealing with responsible adults: 
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that it was nothing 
more than misfortune that made you a willing instrument in the 
organization of mass murder; there still remains the fact that you 
carried out, and therefore actively supported, a policy of mass 
murder. For politics is not like the nursery; in politics obedience 
and support are the same (p. 279). 
A famous experiment in this respect was undertaken 
by Stanley Milgram in the 1960s (Milgram 1974). In this 
experiment, participants were asked to give electric shocks 
to other people who were subjected to a series of questions. 
Every wrong answer was to be answered with a shock, with 
the voltage gradually increasing. A supervisor assured the 
participants that it was all right to administer the shocks, 
even when the subjects were screaming with pain. Eventually 
37 out of 40 participants gave the full range of shocks 
(450 volts!). Milgram showed in this way that in an 
institutional context, with clear lines of authority, people 
can be brought to do almost anything, things that they 
would perhaps never do as a private person or at their own 
discretion, either because of their character make-up or 
convictions or simply because of a lack of courage. 
Creating distance
A fourth way of disuniting oneself can be called ‘creating 
distance’. It is a way that is particularly suitable in modern 
society. We are related to many people in a very abstract 
way. Many relationships are not face to face but are mediated 
by media, social structures, or institutions. This is the reason 
why the consequences of many of our actions and the impact 
it may have on other people are not immediately visible to 
us. Zygmunt Bauman has elaborated this point at length 
in his analysis of the relation between ‘modernity’ and the 
Holocaust (Bauman 1989). His claim is that the horrendous 
Nazi crimes were made possible by the creation of distance 
between people’s actions and their confrontation with 
consequences. Bureaucratic procedures and obfuscating 
language were key elements here. The majority of those 
involved in the massacre of the European Jews were 
directly responsible for only a very small part of the entire 
‘procedure’, being only little cogs in the machinery. In this 
way the normal moral emotions of people were barred. The 
day-to-day relationships between Germans and Jews were 
gradually broken down in order to replace the real flesh-and-
blood Jew next door (who happened to be quite OK) with 
the abstract image of the ‘metaphysical Jew’ of whom the 
country should be purged. Rational procedures seemed to 
invite the bracketing of moral considerations. 
‘Divertissements’ - Pascal
A fifth way can be what Pascal called ‘diversions’ or 
distractions. If you have certain convictions or if you have 
a certain worldview, which demands a certain conduct in 
a given situation, you can escape from the implications of 
your view and ‘disunite’ yourself by just doing something 
else, something that is more fun. Diversions for Pascal were 
activities that, in the words of his Pensées:
… principally hinder us from reflecting upon ourselves and 
which make us insensibly ruin ourselves. Without this we 
should be in a state of weariness, and this weariness would spur 
us to seek a more solid means of escaping from it. But diversion 
amuses us, and leads us unconsciously to death. (Nr. 171)
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To avoid thinking about what we are doing, we just amuse 
ourselves. In this way we – in the words of T.S. Eliot’s 
Choruses From the Rock-VI (1936:106) – ‘constantly try to 
escape from the darkness outside and within’. In this regard 
we can also employ the distinction that Alasdair MacIntyre 
has made between ‘internal goods’ and ‘external goods’ 
(MacIntyre 1981:187ff). The ‘internal goods’ are rewards 
that we get within a certain ‘practice’, within a professional 
context, that have to do with the satisfaction of carrying 
out that practice well, both in moral terms and in terms 
of craftsmanship. We experience a sense of pride and 
satisfaction when we play a game of chess well, regardless of 
whether we get a lot of money for it (which we in almost all 
cases will not get). ‘External goods’ are goods that don’t have 
any intrinsic connection to the work that we do but serve as 
an external stimulus just to get results, regardless of morality 
or craftsmanship. I may have played a terrible game of chess, 
but I don’t care, because someone has promised me a large 
amount of money. I may even have cheated, but that is fine 
as long as the results are OK.  
From the ‘diversions’ of Pascal via the ‘external goods’ of 
MacIntyre we can draw a straight line toward the bonuses, 
the closed circle parties for employees and other ways by 
which bank employees are seduced to put loyalty to the 
company, its shareholders and the maximisation of profits 
above the moral quality of service delivery to clients in the 
financial world.9 
 
Public–private split
A sixth way to make oneself able to live in various, at a 
worldview level perhaps even contradictory, spheres, is to 
separate the private sphere and the public sphere, the sphere 
of one’s own house and the sphere of the outside world. This 
is a key theme in the work of Max Weber, to which I referred 
earlier. In his diagnosis the modern world is characterised 
increasingly by a split between a ‘disenchanted’ public 
world, a world of pure instrumental rationality on the one 
hand and a private world of values and of meaning on the 
other hand. People can easily employ this method to avoid 
questions of values and meaning within the public sphere. 
They can even make the private sphere into a paradise-like 
island, a gated city in an unsafe world in which, during other 
parts of the day, they may participate (and which they may 
even sustain). 
It almost seems as if modern day liberalism has cultivated this 
split and made it into a worldview of its own. In the private 
sphere you do whatever you want, as long as you stay within 
the boundaries of some external, procedural rules. 
A Christian way to disunite: The sacred–profane 
split
A final method that I would like to single out in this respect is 
really only applicable to Christians. It actually is a variation 
9.The docu-movie Inside Job shows that sexual temptations and proposals were also a 
systematic part of the culture of illusions and delusions, of fateful ‘divertissements’, 
that paved the way for the 2008 credit crisis. 
on the public–private split, but here applied to how one 
deals with one’s faith. There has been a strong tendency in 
Christian circles to limit the impact of one’s faith to Sundays 
and the world of liturgy and worship. But as soon as it is 
Monday, one lives as if Sunday has never occurred, and act 
according to the standards of the surrounding environment. 
Many Christian authors have identified this problem and 
given an analysis of it. Just to mention two: Lesslie Newbigin 
analysed the fact–value divide in his seminal The Gospel in 
a Pluralist Society (1989), whilst Bennie van der Walt wrote 
extensively on an integral Christian worldview (Van der 
Walt 1994, 2007, 2010). 
Why does ‘unity of life’ still matter? 
- Authenticity
Is this disunity indeed a problem? Today we live in 
an ‘Age of Authenticity’, as Charles Taylor claims 
(Taylor 2007:473–504). Whether this is only a Western 
phenomenon, I cannot tell. But let us suppose it to be true at 
least in those regions of the world where much of the shape of 
modern life is still determined – the West and the often rather 
Westernised elites in other parts of the world. Characteristic 
of this age is the widespread occurrence of the idea that ‘each 
of us has his or her own way of realising our humanity, and 
that it is important to find and live out one’s own, as against 
surrendering to conformity with a model imposed on us from 
outside, by society, or the previous generation, or religious 
or political authority’ (Taylor 2007:475). ‘Do your own thing’ 
is the guiding maxim of this (in Taylor’s words) ‘ethic of 
authenticity’. It seems that this age will give a deathblow to 
the very idea of a worldview. For is a worldview not exactly 
that, ‘a model imposed on us from outside’? 
However, it seems to me that right now we are moving into 
a second stage of the ‘age of authenticity’. The first stage is 
(was) that of liberation, the freeing of ourselves from the 
‘Great Stories’ of modernity. No more ideologies, be they 
socialist, liberal, racist or religious. Any ‘comprehensive 
framework of basic beliefs’ seems to be oppressive, so I have 
to stay clear of all of them. Long live plurality, including a 
plurality of beliefs. If I need anything like a basic framework, 
I may as well make one myself. Sociologists today are 
characterising this attitude as bricolage, the putting together 
of different stones by a bricklayer. And I don’t have to be 
consistent either. 
However, for a new generation, the demise of ideologies 
is now a matter of an already quite distant past. Now the 
dim awareness grows that many different kinds of things 
are imposed on people anyway, but that they don’t have the 
means to analyse exactly what it is that is imposed on them 
and why should they anyway? Students of economics have, 
for example, been studying the textbooks on economics as if 
they contain the ultimate truth. The textbooks don’t present 
themselves as partisans of any worldview, but as objective. 
And yet, under the surface, it is clear that a particular picture 
of humans and of interhuman relationships is offered, 
the homo economicus who orders his or her preferences 
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and calculates his or her losses and profits. So in a way a 
worldview is still ‘imposed on them from outside’. But how 
is it possible to recognise this? The problem is broader than 
that of hidden ideology in textbooks. In the contemporary 
Western world an entire way of life, the consumer lifestyle, 
is somehow imposed on us. We are supposed to live as homo 
economicus – it is not enough to take him or her as an axiom 
in our mathematical models. However, is this a good way of 
life? Will it give any fulfilment in the future? How can we 
live a meaningful life, as ‘authentic’ human beings, not just 
the life that our culture seems to prescribe? How can I remain 
‘myself’? The fear that the self may lose itself becomes more 
and more pervasive.10 
It may well be that here a new role for something like 
‘worldviews’ is to be found, not as a ‘comprehensive 
framework’ but as exploration of more meaningful over 
against less meaningful or even meaningless ways of life. 
In this context, it is precisely authenticity that may require 
some sort of anchoring in a larger picture or in a more lasting 
basis. Perhaps one cannot be ‘authentic’ if one lives from 
moment to moment, without any distinction between what 
one considers as really important and what is just trivial. 
Charles Taylor speaks in this context about ‘inescapable 
frameworks’ that provide the possibility for making 
qualitative distinctions, distinctions between ‘higher’ and 
‘lower’, between ‘more meaningful’ and ‘less meaningful’ 
(Taylor 1989:3–24, esp. 17; 1991:ch. 4).  
A ‘worldview’ may then be quite similar to what Plato at the 
end of the Republic in the so-called Myth of Er calls ‘patterns 
of life’ that the souls have to choose before they can actually 
enter their earthly existence (Plato 614b–621b). In an ‘age of 
authenticity’ we find ourselves in this earthly existence in the 
very same situation in which Plato saw humans before their 
earthly life: we have to choose a pattern of life, a ‘lifestyle’. 
In the Myth of Er it becomes clear that it is indeed quite 
impossible to live life simply as a sequence of unrelated, 
momentary fragments, and that there is ‘path-dependency’: 
my choice today influences my choices tomorrow. That is 
not only for the obvious reason that if I choose today to be a 
carpenter, it will be very hard to acquire the necessary skills 
to become a medical doctor later in life, but for the more 
important reason that the choices that I make today become 
part of who I am, they become part of the process of my 
habituation. If I choose today to become a ‘profit-maximizer’, 
it will gradually become my habit to think and act in those 
terms. But what may be the consequences in the long run? 
In Plato’s myth there is someone who chooses to become a 
tyrant, because it seems good to have all the power! But then 
he finds out that to be a tyrant is part of a ‘pattern of life’, in 
which you should also be prepared to kill your own children 
as soon as they become a threat to your power or emerge 
as rivals. Choices of life patterns have their consequences. 
But how then to make right choices? This question is highly 
urgent, especially in an individualised age of authenticity. 
10.Aptly phrased by Manuel Castells (1996:23), quoting an essay by Raymond 
Barglow, as ‘Totally isolated, the self seems irretrievably lost to itself.’ 
If I say that worldviews can perhaps play a new role in this 
situation, I am not referring to more or less intellect-driven 
‘comprehensive frameworks’ but to reflections on various 
‘patterns of life’. I am referring rather to ‘deep commitment’ 
than to a ‘system’. Of course, in the articulation of these 
ways of life, it is possible that intellectual dimensions can be 
expressed and thought through. But it is also possible that 
it will merely be limited to one or two rather fragmentary 
insights. 
The exploration of the ‘patterns of life’, of the deep 
commitments they entail, may take different forms. I see at 
least two. The first form may be that of narratives: novels, 
myths, parables, biographies, theatre plays, movies and so 
forth.11 In many (if not all) of these kind of narratives, ways 
of life are explored and analysed, some of whom may seem 
attractive at first, but then turn out to be quite harmful to 
oneself or others, whilst other ways of life may be just the 
other way around. In the background of the stories one 
can also sometimes discern deeper issues that come close 
to what is called ‘a worldview’. There are stories in which 
the protagonist may actually act on an almost Darwinian 
view of life in which the survival of the fittest seem to be 
the deep dynamics of the universe. However, in an ‘age of 
authenticity’ the primary focus is probably going to be on the 
question whether a certain story helps me to understand life 
in general and my life and the existential choices that I have 
to make in particular. 
A second form that ‘worldview’ may take in an ‘age of 
authenticity’ is that of personal examples and personal 
inspiration. The key question may not simply be what 
your ‘encompassing framework’ is, but: ‘by whom are you 
inspired?’, ‘who is your great example?’, ‘who is your hero?’. 
This line goes a long way back in Christian history, of course: 
whom are you going to follow? Do you choose the imitatio 
Christi? Or are there other leading stars in your life? Next to 
storytelling, this second form requires personal, face-to-face 
encounters. 
What then is at stake in either the stories or the encounters? 
Not primarily the ‘encompassing framework’ or the ‘system 
of signs’, but rather what touches you, by what or whom 
you are touched in such a way that whatever you do and 
in whatever situation you find yourself, you would refuse 
to give it up. Whether this is an ‘encompassing framework’ 
or just a fragmentary moment of insight or the memory of 
an impressive encounter with a significant other, is not as 
relevant as the question whether one sees this as something 
of defining value for what one aspires to be. It may be 
a conversation with a high school teacher, it may be the 
memory of one’s parents, it may be Jesus, it may be just a 
simple story from the Bible, it may be a song or a poem, but 
it accompanies you from day to day.12 
11.David Naugle (2002) rightly emphasises the narrative character of worldviews, but 
still talks about a ‘system’: ‘a semiotic system of world-interpreting stories’, p. 291 
(o.c) and passim.
12.Recently, in a upgrading course for high school teachers, we shared these kind 
of memories or ‘self-defining moments’. It continued through the night and the 
outcomes were amazing. 
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The aim of elaborating on ‘what touches you’ as a central 
concern is not to figure out ‘one’s basic beliefs’, but to invite 
a student, or oneself, to acknowledge the inner divisions, 
the many voices that make themselves heard within us. 
The key question then becomes that of discernment: what 
voice is for me the true voice, the voice I am listening to, my 
voice? In terms of Max Weber it is about the choice of one’s 
‘demon’, one’s personal guiding spirit. This discernment 
involves inner struggle: am I in different contexts, in different 
spheres, still in touch with my voice? And can I recognise 
the temptation to ‘disunite’? How can I remain faithful to my 
ultimate concern? The ‘unity of heart’ mentioned in Psalm 86 
is something that has to be achieved from day to day. 
Ultimately, what is at stake when we talk about ‘deep 
commitment’ is what one loves, to what or whom one is 
ultimately committed in such a way that one’s concrete 
choices of actions are directed to it. What one loves is what 
one does; what one does is what one loves. ‘Where your 
treasure is, there will your heart be also’ (Mt 6:21).  
Concluding: Worldview ‘New 
Christian Style’ (with some 
educational suggestions)
Given the situation just adumbrated, it is my belief that 
the idea of worldview still is of great importance. To be 
‘united’ or ‘integrated’, and not to live according to entirely 
contradictory standards, is at the heart of an ‘ethics of 
authenticity’. I believe that the idea of worldview is highly 
relevant exactly at this point. But the primary emphasis is 
then going to be more on ‘deep commitment’ than on an 
intellectual phenomenon of building a comprehensive 
framework. 
Of course, a more elaborate framework may still emerge, 
either in one’s head or as a communal matter. As soon as 
one starts to reflect on commitment and on choices, and 
on the various contexts in which one is called to act, and if 
one in those various contexts wants to achieve a basic level 
of consistency, one starts to built a more encompassing 
framework – nothing wrong with that. One has to ask oneself 
questions about, for example, differences and commonalities 
between economics and the private sphere, between civil 
society and the market, etcetera. There is nothing wrong with 
intellectual engagement and analysis.
However, the preliminary question that needs to be 
discussed is about the deep inspiration, the deep, existential 
commitment that may be fragmentary but calls for enactment, 
for a certain degree of faithfulness. What or whom do you 
love? What, or whom, do you really care about? Where your 
heart is, there your treasure will be.
For a ‘worldview’ conceived in this way to function there are 
certain preconditions, certain basic attitudes that one has to 
practice. I see four of them: 
1. Dialogue, inner and outer. The first precondition is the 
willingness to engage in dialogue, both an inner dialogue 
(what we could call ‘conscience’) and outer dialogue, with 
one’s fellow citizens, peers, colleague, family members, 
and co-believers. The inner dialogue is what Hannah 
Arendt would call ‘to stop and think’ (Arendt 1978:4), to 
allow oneself to be ‘two-in-one’ (Arendt 1978:185ff), to ask 
oneself what one is doing, to interrogate one’s own heart: 
what are you up to, heart? In this way one can explore 
the various voices that are present in oneself, and see 
which ways are harmful, and which way has a future (cf. 
Ps 139:24). One has to allow oneself to be ‘two-in-one’ in 
order to reach the ‘united heart’ that Psalm 86 is talking 
about. Often, it may be necessary to extend this dialogue to 
others, who may help to figure out what really motivates 
one, what one is doing. No one is an island! 
2. Wisdom. Wisdom is the insight into what love, one’s 
commitment to the good of others, implies in this concrete 
situation (in this social domain, in this profession, for this 
person). Love makes you think! It doesn’t make you blind. 
3. Courage. Courage is the concretely embodied thinking, 
the coming together of the vita contemplativa and the 
vita activa. Walk your talk, even if it may bring you in a 
minority position. The inner struggle will yield concrete 
choices, concrete action. 
4. ‘Spirituality’ or ‘fear of the Lord’. In the Biblical tradition 
the ‘fear of the Lord’ does not refer to anxiety, but to the 
joyful and humbling recognition that you are not king 
of the universe, and that there is a God before you, after 
you, over against you, behind you, next to you, above 
you, underneath you. This God is primarily the unique 
dialogue partner, who really is able to clarify one’s inner 
struggles. The inner dialogue really gets an entirely new 
dynamic when the searching of the ways that are present 
in one’s heart starts with the invitation to this Great 
Partner: ‘Search me, O God, and know my heart!’ – I have 
already implicitly referred to Psalm 139 above.  
It is especially at the first point that education comes in. 
Education should in part be directed to the invitation 
into this dialogue. The whole range of narrative forms 
can be of great help here movies, poems, novels, myths, 
parables, biographies, tragedies; from classical, biblical and 
contemporary sources. Moreover, there is sometimes the 
possibility of staging an encounter with inspiring people, 
who within the context of today’s society have managed to 
maintain their ‘authenticity’. In this way, one can support 
students in ‘testing’ worldviews, in testing the various 
‘patterns of life’ that Plato talked about, hoping that they 
may find ways of agape, ways of justice and shalom.  
For students in economics, for example, movies such as Wall 
Street (Stone 1987) with the famous speech of Gordon Gekko 
on ‘Greed is good’, docudramas on the Enron-scandal and the 
documentary Inside Job can be very helpful to bring to the 
fore the existential problems and choices that students face. 
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In Gekko’s (Stone 1987) speech there certainly are almost 
metaphysical themes, for example when he speaks of greed: 
‘Greed is right. Greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and 
captures, the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of 
its forms; greed for life, for money, for love, knowledge, has 
marked the upward surge of mankind (n.p.).’ 
However, what Gekko stands for is also a pattern of life 
that eventually takes him to the isolation of prison. One can 
analyse the movie in terms of its ‘comprehensive framework’; 
it will certainly yield important results. One should in any 
case touch on the deeper level that Gekko loves nobody but 
himself. Enlarging the options for love beyond the self – that 
may be a beautiful task for (Christian) education. 
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